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Abstract
While many studies have suggested or assumed that the periods preceding the onset of intra-state conflict
are similar across time and space, few have empirically tested this proposition. Using the Integrated
Crisis Early Warning System’s domestic event data in Asia from 1998-2010, we subject this proposition
to empirical analysis. We code the similarity of government-rebel interactions in sequences preceding
the onset of intra-state conflict to those preceding further periods of peace using three different metrics:
Euclidean, Levenshtein, and mutual information. These scores are then used as predictors in a bivariate
logistic regression to forecast whether we are likely to observe conflict in neither, one, or both of the states.
We find that our model accurately classifies cases where both sequences precede peace, but struggles to
distinguish between cases in which one sequence escalates to conflict and where both sequences escalate
to conflict. These findings empirically suggest that generalizable patterns exist between event sequences
that precede peace.
Introduction
In late 2010 and early 2011, the “Arab Spring” was sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa.
By March 2011, popular uprisings had led to the removal of dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and Egypt,
and attention turned to Saudi Arabia and the planned “Day of Rage” set to occur March 11. In the
days prior, great emphasis was placed on forecasting future political instability in Saudi Arabia due to
its global economic and political influence. In many ways, the events in Saudi Arabia resembled those
in nearby countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia: young, progressive citizens leveraging technology to
orchestrate demonstrations aimed at ousting the dictatorial regime by any means necessary. However,
certain aspects of Saudi Arabia—such as its extreme oil wealth and small population—differentiate it
from most other states.
Given these differences, an analyst attempting to forecast the degree of political instability is faced
with a difficult question: to what extent should one look for similarities between patterns of events in
Libya and Tunisia in order to build forecasts for Saudi Arabia? Indeed, this type of question exists every
time an analyst attempts to forecast political instability, and speaks to a broader and arguably more
important question for both the policy and academic community alike: to what extent do similarities
exist between sequences of events that precede the onset of intra-state conflict in various states over time?
Although the ramifications are relevant to both qualitative and quantitative conflict forecasting
approaches, it is also theoretically important to our understanding of conflict processes. If patterns do
exist between sequences of events, it suggests that similar causal processes may exist across highly diverse
societies over time. However, if discernible similarities do not exist, it may support some qualitative
arguments that conflicts are unique and should be studied (or forecasted) on a case-by-case basis.
Despite well-developed quantitative literature on intra-state conflict, including both state-year, large-N
analyses and sub-state, sub-annual event data approaches, relatively little attention has been has been
given to address the extent to which similarities exist between sequences of events that precede conflict
occurring across a broad spectrum of countries. The central goal of this paper is to provide an objective,
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and event data studies by building and then comparing nuanced event sequences—some of which precede
an onset of intra-state conflict while most lead to intra-state peace—for a range of diverse countries to
determine the extent to which patterns exist among the sequences.
A number of earlier studies have provided a theoretical foundation for the use of event sequences as
well as empirically demonstrated that sequences can help explain and forecast various political outcomes-
of-interest. For example, [1] and [2] discuss the relevancy of analyzing events in sequence. [3–6] utilize
variations of sequence approaches. However, none of the extant sequence analysis studies focus specifically
on events preceding intra-state conflict onset or utilize methodologies designed to test for the existence of
patterns within high-dimensional sequences occurring across a diverse set of states. In this respect, our
application of the sequence analysis is unique from others.
A critical aspect to carrying out our approach is data availability, since it requires nuanced event data
for a large number of countries over a sufficiently long period of time. In 2011, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA) funded Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) project
released a data set containing over 2 million, daily level events in a who-did what-to whom, when format
for the 29 Asian states under the area of responsibility for the Pacific Command division of the United
States military from 1998 through 2010. These data allow us to build and compare highly nuanced event
sequences occurring across a large number of diverse states for an extensive period of time.
To convert these raw event data into meaningful sequences, we aggregate events into eight weekly
and monthly level sequences that reflect the number of politically relevant events occurring between the
government and opposition groups in each state. Next, using an application of sequence analysis, we
measure the similarity between pairs of sequences using three metrics: Euclidean, Levenshtein, and mutual
information. Finally, we use the scores (which reflect the degree of familiarity between sequences) as
predictors in a bivariate logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that neither, one, or both sequence
in each pair precede an onset of intra-state conflict in the following month.
We find that our model accurately classifies cases where both sequences precede peace, but struggles
to distinguish between cases in which one sequence escalates to conflict and where both sequences escalate
to conflict. These findings suggest generalizable patterns of non-escalatory events exist across time and
space. Furthermore, the hypothesis that states tend to follow unique escalations towards conflict cannot
be rejected, suggesting generalizable patterns of escalatory event sequences do not exist across time and
space. Rather, states may follow unique escalations towards conflict. Additionally, we find that some
states experience intra-state conflict without warning. That is, some states see no changes in their event
structures preceding a conflict onset. These “masked” conflicts are not possible to predict using the
ICEWS event data, and may suggest a class of conflict that is essentially unpredictable with current
research tools.
Methods
Motivation
Since the late 1990s, a wealth of large-N quantitative studies have emerged with the primary goal of
finding statistically significant relationships that hold across a large number of states. [7] and [8] offer two
canonical efforts to analyzing intra-state conflict onset that utilize this framework and demonstrate the
strengths and limitations of this approach. In both studies, the authors utilize time-series cross-sectional
(TSCS) datasets with independent variables that primarily vary cross-sectionally between states, rather
than temporally within the same state, and a binary dependent variable reflecting intra-state conflict
onset. The primary strength of this type of large-N analysis is that it has revealed that certain structural
variables such as rough terrain, GDP per capita, and population size have statistically significant and
relatively stable effects on the likelihood of intra-state conflict onset across time and space ( [8] and [7]
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equal, poorer states with mountainous terrain and large populations are more likely to experience onsets
of intra-state conflict.
Although these approaches have contributed greatly to our understanding of intra-state conflict, their
main weakness is that they do not account for the actual, sub-annual level events that tend to lead to
conflict. For example, population and rough terrain may affect the likelihood of conflict onset in the
aggregate, but these factors by themselves do not cause onsets of conflict in the sense that they are present
both before and after conflict occurs. Rather, it is specific events, such as protests, demonstrations, broken
peace talks, etc., that actually triggers conflict.
Conversely, event data approaches tend to focus on highly specific, sub-annual (often weekly or
monthly) level variation in a broad spectrum of politically relevant events, ranging from verbal threats
to diplomatic meetings to violence. However, these studies tend to focus on events occurring in a single
state or multiple states involved in a joint conflict. For example, [9] and [10] analyze the Arab-Israeli
conflict, [11] and [12] focus on Serbia, and [13] is interested in Chechnya. In [10], data from more than one
state are interpreted jointly, whereas in other studies, such as [4], multiple states are modeled individually
and then empirical findings are informally compared. The primarily goal of most of these studies is to
build accurate, objective, and temporally nuanced forecast of conflicts.
We build on previous efforts by using fine-grain, comprehensive event data at the sub-state level to
compare sub-annual level event sequences across a diverse set of states. Our approach is an attempt to
move towards merging the predominantly cross-sectional, large-N approaches with the time-variant, event
data approaches.
Event Data
The event data used in this research come from the DARPA-funded Integrated Conflict Early Warning
System [14,15]. ICEWS has invested substantial resources in all areas of event data development including
the development of the automated coders, actor and action dictionaries, and for access to a very large
collection of news documents. Its investment into event data development put ICEWS on a scale not seen
in prior event data coding efforts. As [14] notes,
. . . the ICEWS performers used input data from a variety of sources. Notably, they collected
6.5 million news stories about countries in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR [area of
responsibility] for the period 1998-2006. This resulted in a dataset about two orders of
magnitude greater than any other with which we are aware. These stories comprise 253 million
lines of text and came from over 75 international sources (AP, UPI, and BBC Monitor) as
well as regional sources (India Today, Jakarta Post, Pakistan Newswire, and Saigon Times).
The range was eventually extended through 2010, where this study concludes, and beyond. The initial
phase of ICEWS used both the Tabari and the VRA automated coding technologies, with the latter
used as one of the sources to generate the ICEWS ‘events of interest’ [16–20] . These ‘events of interest’
comprise the dependent variable in this study and are discussed in more detail below. In the second phase
of the project, Lockheed-Martin developed a direct translation (with some bug corrections) of Tabari
into Java called Jabari, and the data produced by that system are the data utilized here [21]. These data
are coded according to a 15,000-item action dictionary using the CAMEO typology and an 8,000-item
actor dictionary to code for a broad range of actors, including but not limited to military, police, rebel
groups, and civilians [22]. As a result of the inclusion of local and regional news sources as well as the
comprehensive actor dictionary, the ICEWS dataset provides sufficient sub-state actor nuance and spatial
coverage for us to address our central research question.
4Aggregation Techniques
Every event coded by the ICEWS project is coded in a “who did what to whom and when” format.
This raw event data provides researchers with a tremendous amount of flexibility regarding aggregation
techniques for making the data usable for empirical analysis and exists across three areas of aggregation:
actors, actions, and time. In this section, we provide a brief overview of common aggregation approaches
in the literature and then explain the choices we make regarding actors, actions, and time to build our
event sequences.
Actor Aggregation
Raw event data provide information regarding the actors involved with the action. Typically, this
is formatted in terms of a ‘source’ and a ‘target,’ although some actions are non-directional. Given
this, researchers must determine the actors of interest between whom an event must occur in order for
that event to be included in their study’s empirical models. At a minimum, this means events must
involve at least one actor affiliated with a country of interest. The justification for this minimal level
of actor aggregation is clear: a study focusing on Israeli-Palestinian conflicts would not want to include
events between Aceh rebels and the Indonesian army, as these are not relevant to the conflict of interest.
Although excluding Indonesian rebel activity is obvious, more difficult decisions exist, such as whether or
not to include events between members of the Lebanese and Syrian armies or between the governments of
the United States and Iran. Other questions exist regarding which domestic actors are relevant to the
study of intra-state conflict. In the example above, we would want to exclude a bar fight between two
Israeli citizens over the outcome of a soccer match but not a fight occurring between an Israeli soldier and
a Palestinian government official.
Unfortunately, the majority of studies utilizing event data provide incomplete explanations regarding
their actor aggregation. Others provide a conceptual discussion of actors of interest but do not include
how these concepts are operationalized. For example, [23] discusses “mass” and “state” actors; [24] focuses
on “governing elites,” “mass followship,” “disadvantaged groups,” etc.; [25] addresses “kindred groups,”
“communal groups,” etc; [4] discusses “government” and “dissidents”. Given the lack of formal precedence
regarding transparency in actor aggregation techniques, we attempt to explain our approach as clearly as
possible.
Every coded event in the ICEWS dataset contains two actors: a source and a target. Because ICEWS
uses the CAMEO coding ontology, each actor is coded using a three-tiered scheme. The first tier is
provided for all actors and reflects national identity, which we require to be identical for both the source
and the target. This ensures that we only analyze events occurring domestically. Additionally, the ICEWS
dataset often includes a second tier of information with sub-national level descriptions and, occasionally, a
third tier code that is usually related to the identity of the individual actor. We drop the third tier and
select only relevant groups of actors from the second tier. Specifically, we build three main “classes” of
actors based on their second tier categories for the events that occur domestically:
• Government, which includes actors identified by ICEWS as:
– [MIL] – Military
– [POL] – Police
– [GOV ] – Member of government with no additional information provided
– [−−−] – Actors who do not receive secondary or tertiary codes
• Rebels, which includes actors identified by ICEWS as:
– [INS] – Insurgents
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– [REB] – Rebels
• Other, which includes all other domestic actors including but not limited to:
– [CIV ] – Civilians unaffiliated with another group
– [BUS] – Individuals identified as a business person
– [EDU ] – Students and teachers
The inclusion of [−−−] into government actors is consistent with CAMEO’s ontological assumptions [22].
The domestic events occurring between the government and rebel groups and between rebel groups and
other non-governmental actors are the primary interactions comprising escalatory processes in intra-state
conflict. Therefore, these are the actors used. They comprise two classes of actor aggregations: GOV-REB
and REB-OTH.
Action Aggregation
Event data studies either scale actions, assigning them a score on a conflict-cooperation continuum,
generate event counts reflecting the number of events that occur within conceptually unique categories, or
utilize a mixture of the two techniques, as in [23,26]. The Goldstein Scale, which is the most commonly
used scaling technique within the event data literature, assigns a value to all events coded under the
WEIS scheme on a -10 to +10 conflict-cooperation continuum [27]. On this scale, a -10 reflects the most
conflictual event and +10 indicates the most cooperative event. Despite its widespread use [11,13,17,27,28],
the Goldstein Scale requires additional levels of aggregation beyond the initial scaling, which leads to a
number of operational difficulties. For example, consider a day during which an armed killing (which
receives a -10 score) and a peace-treaty signing (which receives a +10 score) occur between the same actors.
The sum and the mean of the Goldstein scores—two of the most common approaches for working with
scaled data—would result in coding of 0, the same score that days with no activity receive. Theoretically,
it is apparent that the nature of events occurring on a day comprised of purely neutral events and a day
with a -10 event and a +10 event are fundamentally different.
While this example of two events perfectly canceling is hypothetical, the problem of violent events
masking the concurrent presence of cooperative actions—notably negotiations occurring during periods of
ongoing violence—is very real and occurs frequently. This is further complicated by the fact that some
actions like “comments” and “meetings” have Goldstein scores that are small in magnitude, whereas
violent events have a scale score of -10. Consequently a small amount of violence can mask a lot of talking.
Because of these problems with scaled data, a number of other studies utilize count structures [9,29,30].
[31] put forth the first event data count structure by placing all events into one of the four conceptually
unique, mutually exclusive categories. The original coding was done using WEIS actions, which we
translate to the CAMEO categories listed below:
• Verbal Cooperation: The occurrence of dialogue-based meetings (e.g. negotiations, peace talks),
statements that express a desire to cooperate or appeal for assistance (other than material aid) from
other actors. CAMEO categories 01 to 05.
• Material Cooperation: Physical acts of collaboration or assistance, including receiving or sending
aid, reducing bans and sentencing, etc. CAMEO categories 06 to 09.
• Verbal Conflict : A spoken criticism, threat, or accusation, often related to past or future potential
acts of material conflict. CAMEO categories 10 to 14.
6• Material Conflict : Physical acts of a conflictual nature, including armed attacks, destruction of
property, assassination, etc. CAMEO categories 15 to 20.
Overall, these event count structure makes fewer assumptions than the Goldstein Scale about the
impact of events. Moreover, because negative counts are impossible, this approach does not suffer from
problems of generating sum or mean scores that affect the Goldstein Scale. Although this count approach
is simpler than scaling methods, [9] and [12] still find strong empirical results with data aggregated into
these four categories. Therefore, an event count technique parallel to [31] but adjusted for the CAMEO
categories as indicated above is employed. This approach provides a straightforward representation of the
number and type of events that occur while making the fewest assumptions about future effects of the
events.
Temporal Aggregation
Researchers must temporally aggregate data in order to perform empirical analyses at levels appropriate
for both their theoretical and empirical models. All of the previously mentioned event datasets code the
exact day on which events occur. As the specific time-of-day that events occur is not reported, events
must at the very minimum be aggregated to the daily level [9, 11,12]. Weekly [32,33], monthly [28,34],
quarterly [26], and even annual level aggregations are also found in the literature.
Often, the level of temporal aggregation is more subjective than the other areas of aggregation.
Furthermore, a number of studies have shown that different temporal aggregations can affect the empirical
results [35–37]. Therefore, it is important to both justify the level of aggregation used and, if possible, use
multiple levels as robustness checks. We use both weekly and monthly levels of temporal aggregation.
Doing so allows us to capture event fluctuations that occur across small periods of time and is more
robust to noise than daily level aggregations. Furthermore, it allows for robustness checks across two
levels of aggregation. [4] and others have attempted to move beyond traditional, calendar-based practices
by aggregating according to empirically discernible temporal clusters within the data. While we do not
attempt such an aggregation here, it presents an interesting alternative.
To generate weekly and monthly-level data, we sum the event counts for all relevant actor combinations
(GOV-REB, REB-OTH) across each action (verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal conflict,
material conflict), which results in eight sequences of event counts for each unit-of-analysis (the period
preceding each conflict onset and the period preceding selected peaces). For example, Table 1 contains
sequences that precede a conflict onset in Indonesia. This represents the data after sequence construction
but prior to sequence analysis.
Table 1. Event Count Structures Preceding Conflict in Indonesia:
Week 45, 2001 – Week 5, 2002
Actor-Action 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 1 2 3 4 5
Verbal Cooperation 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 4
GOV-REB Material Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Verbal Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Material Conflict 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 3 4
Verbal Cooperation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
REB-OTH Material Cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verbal Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Material Conflict 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Our approach to sequence construction differs from those utilized in the related sequence analysis
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occur within fixed units of time (weeks and months), whereas other studies such as [3], [1], and [4] focus
on the sequential ordering of events regardless of time, which means that they are unable to explicitly
account for the amount of time that transpire between events. Second, our approach allows for multiple
events to occur between multiple actors simultaneously, whereas the extant studies place events in a
sequential order. Third, we build sequences from event counts as opposed to a single event [1, 3, 38] or a
conflict-cooperation scaled value [4]. We argue that utilizing counts captures the greater variation in the
intensity of actions. Overall, we believe our approach to sequence construction is a more effective way
capture the complexity of event structures that precede intra-state conflict onsets.
Results
Research Design
Our research design is a combination of a sequence analysis and regression approach. Using a sequence
analysis, we construct variables that reflect a degree of similarity between pairs of sequences where both
precede peace, one precedes peace and one precedes conflict, and where both precede conflict. After
comparing the scores for each pair type, we test for the ability of event structures to distinguish pair types
using a bivariate logistic regression.
The conflict onset variable (GTDS) is a binary measure constructed from a ground truth measure
of intra-state conflict that has been developed by DARPA. Table 2 is a complete listing of all conflict
onsets in our data. The objective of ground truth data in conflict studies is to provide a more immediate
representation of a conflict than can be provided purely by journalistic or historical reporting. Although
DARPA has chosen not to publicly release the explicit coding rules for the GTDS, it has been used as
a dependent variables in a number of conflicted forecasting publications, some of which are specifically
designed for policy planning (see [14,39–41] for other uses of the GTDS). The GTDS contains four categories
of intra-state conflict at the monthly level: Rebellion, Insurgency, Domestic Crisis, and Ethno-religious
Violence.
For a state-month to be coded as an onset in our data, a positive observation in a single category must
be preceded by at least three months of peace in that category. According to this operationalization of
onset, it is possible for a state to experience two or more onsets in a given month so long as the onsets
occur in different categories.
To establish pairs for comparison, we select all 13-week sequences in our dataset that precede conflict
and a random sample of sequences that precede peace at a ratio of about 2:1 peace-preceding:conflict-
preceding. For robustness, we have also constructed these sequences at the monthly level based on
three-month periods. The 2:1 ratio is ad hoc and could bias the results towards increasing the number
of predicted onsets relative to what would be predicted given a true random sample. However, the
peace-preceding sequences must be sampled in some fashion to avoid excessive overlapping sequences,
and given the small number of onsets generally analyzed in this literature we deem 2:1 an appropriate
ratio. To avoid comparing sequences where there is very little to no rebel interactions (e.g., Australia), we
only randomly sample from the 15 states that experience at least one onset. This results in 113 sequences
that precede peace and 53 sequences that precede conflict onset. We then calculate the similarity scores
for each pair of sequences, resulting in
(
166
2
)
, or 13,695 pairs (observations), each with eight explanatory
variables (the distances between the eight count variables of each sequence).
The Euclidean distance, the most intuitive of the three and the one through which the primary results
of this paper are reported, is seen in Equation (1).√√√√ 13∑
i=1
(Aij −Bij)2 (1)
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State Onset Date State Onset Date
Bangladesh May, 1998 Bangladesh January, 2004
Bangladesh January, 2008 China January, 2003
Fiji May, 2000 Fiji January, 2001
Indonesia November, 1998 Indonesia January, 1998
Indonesia February, 2001 Indonesia August, 2005
Indonesia November, 2006 Indonesia January, 2006
Indonesia March, 2006 Indonesia August, 2008
Indonesia April, 2009 Indonesia June, 2009
Indonesia March, 2009 India January, 2001
India January, 2003 India January, 2004
India July, 2007 India February, 2008
Cambodia September, 2001 Cambodia January, 2001
South Korea August, 2007 Laos January, 2002
Sri Lanka January, 2002 Madagascar January, 2000
Madagascar January, 2003 Madagascar January, 2008
Madagascar November, 2010 Myanmar August, 2007
Myanmar June, 2009 Myanmar January, 2009
Myanmar October, 2010 Myanmar November, 2010
Nepal November, 2005 Nepal February, 2006
Nepal June, 2010 Nepal August, 2010
Philippines February, 1998 Philippines January, 2000
Philippines January, 2005 Solomon Islands April, 2000
Solomon Islands January, 2002 Solomon Islands April, 2006
Thailand January, 2003 Thailand January, 2005
Thailand July, 2008 Thailand September, 2008
Thailand January, 2008 Thailand November, 2009
Thailand September, 2010
To illustrate this process, consider the example in Table 3. For State A, we have eight actions measured
over 13 weeks. For each of these eight actions, we calculate the Euclidean distance with the corresponding
action in State B. The Euclidean distance is a conceptually and mathematically straightforward approach
used to calculate the distance between two vectors, and has been used in the study of International
Relations in other applications [42]. This robust approach is applied to vectors according to the formula
in Equation (1), in which A and B are the two states in the pair, i is the week/month, and j is the action
variable (e.g., verbal cooperation). As can be seen in Table 3 for a single action, the Euclidean distance
would be calculated for the sequences {5,2,3,5,2,3,0,2,1,1,2,0,0} and {4,0,1,2,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,4}. In this
example, the Euclidean distance approximately equals 7.28.
Table 3. Vectors of Verbal Cooperation Counts for State A and State B
Actor-Action Weekly Counts
GOV-REB (State A)
Verbal Cooperation 5 2 3 5 2 3 0 2 1 1 2 0 0
GOV-REB (State B)
Verbal Cooperation 4 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
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event sequences are occurring in different places and at different times. For example, the distance between
states with high levels of journalistic reporting and states with low levels will always be large, even if the
underlying event structures are comparable. Or, events in one country may unfold over a period of months
while events in another country, although similar in structure, unfold over just a few weeks. Additionally, as
a second order metric the Euclidean distance may not capture higher order interdependencies in the event
structures. The sequence analysis literature across disciplines is rich in applications of distance and related
metrics to account for higher order interdependencies [43–45]. To further explore such interdependencies
and to extract the most information from our data, we also use the Levenshtein distance and mutual
information to compare event sequences.
The Levenshtein distance is an edit distance, developed and used primarily in computer science [46,47]
but with applications to sequence analysis as well [48, 49]. The intuition behind the general class of
edit distances is to measure the number of computer calculations necessary to transform one string, or
vector, into another. The available transformations are shifts and substitutions. A shift is an insertion
that effectively shifts the sequence to the left or right. So, if two sequences are identical except for the
fact that one sequence began at time t and the other at t+ 1, the Levenshtein distance algorithm would
simply shift the sequence in the appropriate direction, just a single calculation. Substitutions are also
measured as a single calculation, regardless of the “distance” between the numbers (or characters) being
substituted. That is, if two sequences are perfectly aligned with the exception of the nth character, the
Levenshtein distance algorithm would simply substitute the nth character, again just a single calculation.
In other words, whereas the Euclidean distance takes into account how far apart the nth characters in each
sequence are, the Levenshtein distance views this as a single calculation regardless of the physical number.
Mutual information is an entropy-based metric from Information Theory [50]. Rather than measur-
ing a geometric or edit distance, mutual information measures the reduction in uncertainty (entropy)
about Sequence A that may be ascertained from knowledge of Sequence B. This robust metric may be
particularly useful in instances where both the Euclidean and Levenshtein distances are large, but high
order interdependencies still exist that the metrics do not capture. In such cases, mutual information may
discover a relationship that may be useful in characterizing the sequence outcomes as something different
than what the Euclidean or Levenshtein may produce. Here, we apply Linfoot’s normalization of mutual
information [51], as described in [43]. Specifically, mutual information is defined in Equation (2), where X
and Y represent our discrete sequences of events and IN is the normalization of the mutual information
function.
I(X,Y ) =
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y)log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
IN (X,Y ) =
√
1− e2I(X,Y ) (2)
Sequence Comparison
We calculate the similarity scores among all possible pairs of peace-preceding sequences and conflict-
preceding sequences, which results in three types of sequence pairs for comparison:
• Type 0 – Neither of the compared 13-week sequences precede conflict onset
• Type 1 – One of the compared 13-week sequences precede onset and the other did not
• Type 2 – Both of the 13-week sequences precede conflict
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Using the Euclidean Distance to build intuition for the approach, imagine a case where event sequences
in periods preceding conflict are similar across time and space. In such cases, Type 2 distances should
be comparatively small. Conversely, large distances between Type 2 pairs suggests that event sequences
of periods preceding conflict onset may not follow similar trends across time and space. The same logic
applies to distances generated by Type 0 pairs, which will be small if periods proceeding peace exhibit
similar event structures. Lastly, distances generated by Type 1 pairs reflects the extent to which periods
preceding peace and conflict onset vary, meaning that small distances (relative to Type 0 and Type 2
distances) suggest that we may be unable to discern between sequences preceding peace and conflict.
Thus, if sequences preceding peace are similar and sequences preceding conflict are similar (but different
from those preceding peace), an empirical model will struggle to correctly differentiate between Type 0
and Type 2 pairs in an out-of-sample context. If we assume that sequences preceding peace are similar
(an assumption with strong empirical support), then the extent to which patterns exist between sequences
preceding a conflict onset depends on the out-of-sample misclassification of Type 2 pairs, explained by
the two conditions below.
• Condition 1: If patterns exist between sequences preceding conflict, the empirical model will
struggle to differentiate between Type 2 and Type 0. When the model misclassifies sequences
generated by Type 2 pairs, it will predict that these sequences were generated by Type 0 pairs.
• Condition 2 If patterns do not exist between sequences preceding conflict, the empirical model will
struggle to differentiate between Type 2 and Type 1 pairs. When the model misclassifies sequences
generated by Type 2 pairs, it will predict that these sequences were generated by Type 1 pairs.
The histograms in Figures 1 and 2 reflect the distribution of distances by pair type for the weekly and
monthly aggregations using the Euclidean distance. Since the distributions of the eight distances are very
similar, they are summed to add mass to the histograms to better illustrate the differences among pair
types. The correlation of various action categories is a common feature of event data research and has
been reported in a number of studies [16,27,52].
These histograms suggest two important findings. First, distances generated by Type 0 pairs tend
to be small and are clustered around 0, supporting our assumption that sequences that precede peace
are similar. Second, if strong patterns existed between sequences preceding intra-state conflict onsets,
then we would expect to see a spike in distribution density of the Type 2 histogram near 0. Clearly, no
such spike exists. Instead, these histograms illustrate that distances generated by Type 2 pairs appear
more similar to those generated by Type 1 pairs than by Type 0 pairs. Although Figures 1 and 2 provide
strong visual evidence suggesting support for Condition 2, we next present an empirical model to test for
which condition is being met.
Regression and Classification Analysis
To more rigorously test for similarities between pair types, we estimate a bivariate logistic regression
using our distance measures as regressors and include a control for the number of ongoing crises. The
bivariate logistic regression is an appropriate choice because there are two outcome variables for each
pair: conflict onset in State A and conflict onset in State B [53]. The bivariate logit allows us to not
only calculate the marginal probabilities of YA and YB (i.e., the probability of onset in State A and the
probability of onset in State B independent of one another), but it also estimates the joint probabilities of
YA,B (i.e., the probability of (no) conflict in both states), providing us with an estimate of the relationship
between the two marginal probabilities of onset. Furthermore, since the regressors reflect the distance
between two sequences, each of which has its own outcome, we expect that the marginal probabilities of
YA and YB are strongly correlated, making the bivariate logit a theoretically justified method given our
data.
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Figure 1. Weekly Euclidean Distances
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0 50 100 150 200
Euclidean Distance
D
en
si
ty Type 0
Type 1
Type 2
Figure 2. Monthly Euclidean Distances
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YA,B = β0.1 + β0.2 + β1V erbCoopGOV−REB + β2V erbConflGOV−REB + β3MaterCoopGOV−REB
+β4MaterConflGOV−REB + β5V erbCoopREB−OTH + β6V erbConflREB−OTH
+β7MaterCoopREB−OTH + β8MaterConflREB−OTH + β9NumCrisis+  (3)
We use the bivariate logit to classify pair types according to the following three steps. First, we
estimate our model on training data consisting of a random sample of half our observations. The regressors
are the eight distance measures and a control variable to account for the number of ongoing conflicts during
each state-month. The specification can be seen in Equation (3), and all estimates are computed using
the VGAM package in R version 2.14.2. Second, using the estimates from the training data, predicted
probabilities are calculated for each pair type using the remaining data. However, the bivariate logit
provides four predicted probabilities because we have two dichotomous dependent variables – YA ∈ {0,1}
and YB ∈ {0,1} – and therefore four potential outcomes: YA,B ∈ {(0,0);(0,1);(1,0);(1,1)}. The predicted
probabilities for the Type 0 and Type 2 pairs are the predicted probabilities YA,B=(0,0) and YA,B=(2,2),
respectively. For Type 1 pairs, the predicted probability is equal to the sum of the predicted probabilities
of YA,B=(1,0) and YAB=(0,1) because the distance from State A to State B is the same as the distance
from State B to State A (non-directional). Finally, our decision rule is to classify each pair by the highest
predicted probability. For example, if the predicted probabilities of a Type 0, Type 1, and Type 2 pair
are 0.7, 0.2, and 0.1 respectively, the rule classifies Type 0 to be positive while Type 1 and Type 2 are
negative. The decision rule is formalized in Equation (4).
Pˆ T =
 0 if pr(Y0,0) > pr(Y0,1) + pr(Y1,0) and pr(Y1,1)1 if pr(Y0,1) + pr(Y1,0) > pr(Y0,0) and pr(Y1,1)
2 if pr(Y1,1) > pr(Y0,0) and pr(Y0,1) + pr(Y1,0)
(4)
The estimates from the regression model are not particularly relevant for our purposes because we are
concerned with the model’s ability to distinguish among the three pair types and are not interested in
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the effect or explanatory power of any variable or set of variables. Additionally, high collinearity exists
between the underlying count variables, which further complicates the interpretation of the coefficients.
Therefore, we focus on our model’s out-of-sample classification accuracy rather than the specific covariates
and their empirical significance.
The predicted and true classes for the out-of-sample observations are shown in a confusion matrix in
Table 4 for the Euclidean distance. From these statistics, performance measures detailing the model’s
ability to classify out-of-sample observations are calculated and reported in Table 5. Taken together, the
confusion matrix and the performance measures enable the analysis of which pair types are distinguishable
based on event sequences, which allows us to determine whether Condition 1 or Condition 2 receives
empirical support. The performance measures of sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV)
and negative predictive value (NPV) are used to assess our out-of-sample classification accuracy:
• Sensitivity – the percent of all positive observations correctly classified
#ofTruePositives
#ofTruePositives+ #ofFalseNegatives
• Specificity – the percent of all negative observations correctly classified
#ofTrueNegatives
#ofFalsePositives+ #ofTrueNegatives
• Positive Predictive Value – the percent of positive predictions that are accurate
#ofTruePositives
#ofTruePositives+ #ofFalsePositives
• Negative Predictive Value – the percent of negative predictions that are accurate
#ofTrueNegatives
#ofFalseNegatives+ #TrueNegatives
Table 4. Confusion Matrix of Bivariate Logistic Classification
Monthly Euclidean Predicted Class
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Total
Type 0 3034 4 0 3038
True Class Type 1 1091 1500 353 2944
Type 2 85 289 325 699
Total 4210 1793 678 6681
Weekly Euclidean Predicted Class
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Total
Type 0 3183 0 0 3183
True Class Type 1 1151 1524 358 3033
Type 2 93 303 316 712
Total 4427 1827 674 6928
For our purposes, we care about the model’s ability to distinguish among types. Therefore, we would
like to see that our model actually classifies observations into all three pair types. As can be seen in Table
4, at the weekly level 4,427 are predicted to be Type 0, 1,827 to be Type 1, and 674 to be Type 2, which
places enough predictions in each class to move forward.
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Table 5. Performance of Bivariate Logistic Classification
Performance Measure Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
Sensitivity 99.87 50.95 46.49
Monthly Specificity 50.10 89.88 75.79
Pos. Pred. Value 72.07 83.66 47.94
Neg. Pred. Value 99.84 70.46 93.77
Sensitivity 100 50.25 44.38
Weekly Specificity 49.13 89.83 75.72
Pos. Pred. Value 71.90 83.42 46.88
Neg. Pred. Value 100 70.42 93.67
Test-N = 6,681 (Monthly) and 6,928 (Weekly); values are percentages.
Classification Results for Euclidean Distances
Tables 4 and 5 provides a number of important results. First, we can distinguish between most pairs of
sequences preceding peace and most sequences preceding conflict, but not all. As apparent by our the
near-perfect sensitivity, the model over-predicts Type 0 pairs. Recall that for Type 0 pairs, the distances
tend to be small, indicating that periods preceding peace are characterized primarily by the absence
of events involving domestic rebel groups. Given this, the model is classifying most or all observations
with similarly small distances as having been generated by Type 0 pairs. These “masked” conflicts are
discussed in greater detail below.
The sensitivity for Type 1 and Type 2 pairs is relatively low, at 50% and 44%, respectively. This
means our model classifies just over half of all Type 1 pairs correctly and just under half of all Type 2
pairs correctly. However, the PPV for Type 1, approximately 83%, is large. This is in comparison to 72%
for Type 0 and about 48% for Type 2. Overall, this suggests that while we misclassify a large proportion
of Type 1 pairs, when the model classifies a pair as Type 1 it is correct 83% of the time. Although our
model performs well classifying Type 0 pairs, it struggles to accurately classify Type 2 pairs. When it
predicts a pair to be of Type 2, it is correct less than half of the time.
Together, these measures indicate that our model struggles to correctly predict when an observation is
a Type 2 pair. The question of central importance to this paper is whether Type 2 pairs are misclassified
as Type 0 (i.e., Condition 1) or as Type 1 (i.e., Condition 2). In total, our dataset contains 712 Type 2
pairs using weekly level sequences, of which we misclassify 396. Among these, our model predicts 303 to
be Type 1 and only 93 to be Type 0, which is a ratio of greater than 3:1. This provides strong support for
Condition 1 and suggests that, based on our data and research design, we are unable to identify common
patterns between event sequences that precede onsets of intra-state conflict.
Our findings on the patterns of escalation can be thought of using a medical analogy. Consider a
random sample of patients whose vital signs are monitored weekly. Variation between the vital signs of
healthy patients (i.e., Type 0 pairs) is likely to be low; all will have a temperature of about 98.6, they
will not feel stomach or chest paints, etc. However, the distance between the vital signs of a patient who
continues to maintain health and a patient who is falling ill is likely to be large. Additionally, the distance
between vital sign sequences of two patients approaching an illness (i.e., a Type 2 pair) may be quite high,
as different illnesses may alter vital signs in very different ways.
Classification Results for Levenshtein and Mutual Information
Tables 6 and 7 detail the classification of the bivariate logit model when sequence similarity is scored using
the Levenshtein distance and mutual information, both at the weekly level of aggregation. In general, the
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results are quite robust to the metric used and the primary finding, that Type 2 pairs continue to be
classified as Type 1, remains strong in both experiments. In fact, these metrics strengthen the finding.
When using the Levenshtein distance, there are 3.76 times more Type 2 pairs classified as Type 1 than
there are Type 2 pairs classified as Type 0. When using the mutual information metric, there are 7.35
times more Type 2 pairs predicted to be Type 1 than there are Type 2 pairs predicted to be Type 0.
In the Euclidean model, this number is 3.26. Thus, both metrics, and especially mutual information,
provides more support for Condition 2 (that Type 2 pairs appear more like Type 1 than Type 0) than the
Euclidean metric.
Table 6. Confusion Matrix Using Levenshtein and Mutual Information
Weekly Levenshtein Predicted Class
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Total
Type 0 3080 103 0 3183
True Class Type 1 1137 1652 244 3033
Type 2 92 346 274 712
Total 4309 2101 518 6928
Weekly Mutual Info. Predicted Class
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Total
Type 0 2953 230 0 3183
True Class Type 1 855 1909 269 3033
Type 2 49 360 303 712
Total 3857 2499 572 6928
Table 7. Performance Using Levenshtein and Mutual Information
Performance Measure Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
Sensitivity 96.76 54.47 38.48
Levenshtein Specificity 51.43 86.11 76.13
Pos. Pred. Value 71.48 78.63 52.90
Neg. Pred. Value 96.07 71.39 93.17
Sensitivity 92.77 62.94 42.56
Mutual Information Specificity 59.07 83.59 78.22
Pos. Pred. Value 76.56 76.39 52.97
Neg. Pred. Value 92.51 74.62 93.57
Test-N = 6,928 weekly observations; values are percentages.
Scoring the sequences using mutual information provides an additional interesting finding that should
be explored in future research. Specifically, relative to the Euclidean and Levenshtein models, the mutual
information model is considerably more likely to predict Type 1 pairs. Of the 6,928 out-of-sample
observations, 2,499 are predicted to be Type 1 whereas just 1,827 are predicted to be Type 1 using the
Euclidean metric. While the number of correctly identified Type 1 pairs is greatest for mutual information,
its PPV is just 76%, compared with 79% for Levenshtein and 83% for Euclidean. Furthermore, 230
predicted Type 1 pairs are in truth Type 0, where the Levenshtein model mispredicts 103 such cases,
and the Euclidean model mispredicts 0 of them. This suggests that the mutual information metric
captures a relationship not represented, or represented less, by the other metrics. In future work, perhaps
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combinations of these classes of metrics—geometric distances, edit distances, and entropy-based—could
be exploited in an ensemble method that leverages the strengths of each.
‘Masked’ Conflict
Although each model predicts the majority of misclassified Type 2 pairs to be Type 1, they still predict
93 (Euclidean), 92 (Levenshtein), and 49 (mutual information) to be of Type 0. In the Euclidean model,
of the 3,033 Type 1 pairs, 1,151 are misclassified to be Type 0. However, at the weekly level Type 0 pairs
are never misclassified as Type 1 or Type 2. The intuition is that these misclassified conflict-preceding
sequences are quantitatively similar to peace-preceding sequences. In other words, they are characterized
predominantly by the absence of events involving rebels. These “masked” conflicts present a challenge for
event data forecasting models.
We suggest two factors that may be responsible for masked conflicts. First, it is possible that some
conflict onsets are not preceded by politically relevant events and occur spontaneously. For example,
we believe the Tunisian Revolution that began in December, 2010 would fall into this class of conflict.
However, despite the lack of observable “events”, it is possibly that changes in popular sentiments occurred
prior to the onset of conflict. Moving forward, it may be possibly to capture variation in sentiments that
may occur in the absence of actual events through content analysis of social media outlets like Facebook
and Twitter.
Second, rebel activity may be occurring but not reported in the news. This is possible in places where
rebel activity is so common that it becomes no longer newsworthy, as may be the case in the Philippines
in the early 2000s. Additionally, non-reporting of actual events may occur in regions with minimal or
non-existent formal journalistic reporting. ICEWS’ use of 75 international news sources is an attempt to
ameliorate this concern; regardless, there will always be reporting bias in published sources. For instance,
it is highly unlikely for a Hezbollah attack in Tel Aviv to go unreported, but much easier for violence on
the Solomon Islands to go unreported. When modeling events, zero-inflated models [54] or occupancy
models [55] could be used to correct for the disproportionate share of zeros. However, we are referring to
the more general concern of sparse data introducing a form of measurement error into the event data.
Although it is difficult to account for a lack of reporting, the mutual information metric would account
for lower levels of reporting in such places, and this may be one reason why that model predicts just 49
Type 2 pairs to be Type 0 while the Euclidean and Levenshtein predict 93 and 92, respectively.
To illustrate where masked conflicts occur, Figure 3 is a side-by-side-by-side bar plot by state using
the Euclidean model. The black bar corresponds to the state’s proportion of the 53 conflict onsets. The
dark gray bar, or the middle bar, reflects to the state’s proportion of onset sequences in Type 1 pairs that
have been misclassified as Type 0. The light gray bar indicates the state’s proportion of onset sequences
in Type 2 pairs that have been misclassified as Type 0. As expected, the dark gray and light gray bars
are almost identical.
If the masked conflicts were dispersed randomly by state, the black and gray bars would be roughly
the same for all states. However, we see that several states have a disproportionately high share of masked
conflicts while others have a disproportionately low share. The states that appear most associated with
masked conflicts are Fiji [FIJ], Madagascar [MDG], and the Solomon Islands [SLB]. This is seen by the
disproportionately high gray bars in comparison to the black bar for each state. As suggested above, these
states are associated with masked conflicts primarily because of the absence of reporting, and thus present
a challenge for event data studies. On the other hand, masked conflicts do not occur in Indonesia [IDN],
India [IND], Sri Lanka [LKA] or the Philippines [PHL], which the absence of both dark and light gray
bars for these states demonstrates. The absence of masked conflicts in these states, which likely receive
more comprehensive reporting, suggests potential media bias.
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Figure 3. Proportion of Onsets and Masked Conflicts by State
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Conclusion
The central goal of this study is to rigorously analyze the extent to which similarities exist between
sequences of events that precede the onset of intra-state conflict in various states over time. To achieve
this, we introduce an application of sequence analysis that allows us to leverage the strengths of both
large-N and event data studies in order to most effectively address our central question. Using the ICEWS
data, we construct and compare sequences of event counts based on the activities of government and
opposition forces. The results lead to two important findings.
First, our models over-predict Type 0, misclassifying both Type 1 and Type 2 pairs. That is, pairs
of sequences where one or both precede conflict appear similar to pairs where both precede peace. We
hypothesize that this occurs due to “masked” conflicts, which occur either spontaneously and are not
preceded by prior political events, or are preceded by relevant events that are simply not reported. Moving
forward, we believe that content posted in social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter may provide
information regarding shifts in popular sentiments that may occur in the absence of actual events. Thus,
accounting for sentiments may allow researchers greater leverage to predict “spontaneous” masked conflicts,
which they would otherwise be unable to do relying solely on event data.
Second, and of central importance to this paper, is that the bivariate logit models tend to incorrectly
predict Type 2 pairs to be Type 1. This indicates that sequences preceding peace exhibit identifiable
patterns and may be related to the fact that peace is best characterized by the absence of conflict, while
conflict takes many forms and exhibits a variety of different event structures. This is an important
contribution to both academics and policy analysts who are interested in intra-state conflict because it
suggests that although certain structural variables may have consistent effects of conflict onsets across time
and space, the actual events that comprise the escalation towards conflict may be unique to the conflict.
For the academic community, this raises important questions, such as what are the causal mechanisms
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connecting structural conditions like regime type or GDP to actual day-to-day events. For policy
analysts, this finding may suggest that less weight should be given to identifying historical similarities
when attempting to forecast conflict onset. Like in most quantitative studies of conflict, this finding is
contingent on the accuracy of our data, aggregation strategies, and choice of empirical model. Cognizant
of this, we include numerous robustness checks, including performing all empirical analyses on both weekly
and monthly levels of temporal aggregation, which all support our central findings. However, given the
long qualitative literature suggesting that similarities between historical cases do exist (see [56], [57]
and [58]), we do not want to dismiss the possibility that generalizable patterns of events may exist in a
dataset with greater temporal and spatial coverage. Overall, we hope that this study demonstrates that
objective comparisons of nuanced event sequences are able to generate substantively important findings
and encourages future analysis of the actual events that precede onsets of conflict.
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Supporting Information
• S1 Table: Replication with UCDP Data.
The analysis has been replicated using the Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s Armed Conflict dataset [59].
These data measure episodes of intra-state conflict at the yearly level, where a conflict onset is identified
at the date when the 25 battle-death threshold has been passed. The episode of conflict is considered
ongoing until the end date or, when no end date is reported, the end of the calendar year.
Due to the limited scope of the ICEWS event data, there are just 19 identified episodes of conflict
onset in UCDP, yielding just 105 Type 2 pairs, 540 Type 1 pairs, and 630 Type 0 pairs. Despite the
limited number of observations, some of the results are quite consistent with the GTDS data, particularly
for Type 0 predictions. With respect to the UCDP data, of those predicted to be Type 0, 59% are in
truth Type 0, 36% are Type 1, and 5% are Type 2. For the GTDS data, of those predicted to be Type 0,
72% are 0, 26% are Type 1, and 2% are Type 2. Given the low number of observations in the UCDP data,
we do not believe these trends to be inconsistent.
For Type 1 predictions, the trend is somewhat inconsistent, particularly because there are 97 cases
where the model predicts Type 1 when the pair is actually a Type 0. This means these pair distances
appear as if one is experiencing conflict when there is no conflict. This never occurs with the GTDS
Euclidean model, but does for the Levenshtein and mutual information models. One explanation for this
difference is that the UCDP data are measured at a coarser level of granularity than the GTDS. The
event data sequences, then, may be accurately observing low levels of conflict that would be captured in
the GTDS but are not captured in the UCDP.
As has been found in the primary experiments, Type 2 predictions are relatively rare. This, coupled
with the greatly reduced number of Type 2 observations, leads to just one Type 2 prediction. Although
it is correct, there are simply not enough Type 2 predictions to make any meaningful inferences. With
respect to the misclassification of pairs that are in truth Type 2, using the UCDP data we find that 35
are predicted to be Type 1 and 18 are predicted to be Type 0. This ratio of about 2:1 is smaller than
the roughly 3:1 reported by the Euclidean model, and considerably smaller than the 7:1 reported by the
mutual information model. However, Type 2 pairs still appear more similar to Type 1 than Type 0, and
thus the UCDP robustness check still supports Condition 2, despite the lack of observations.
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S1 Table: Replication with UCDP Data
Confusion Matrix Using UCDP Data
Weekly Euclidean Predicted Class
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Total
Type 0 224 97 0 321
True Class Type 1 137 111 0 248
Type 2 18 35 1 54
Total 379 243 1 623
Performance with UCDP Data
Performance Measure Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
Sensitivity 69.78 44.76 1.85
Weekly Specificity 37.09 60.00 58.88
Euclidean Pos. Pred. Value 59.10 45.68 100
Neg. Pred. Value 60.25 63.95 91.48
Test-N = 623 (Weekly); values are percentages.
